Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
Volume 11

Issue 1

Article 17

2010

Who is John Doe and Why Do We Care? Why a Uniform Approach
to Dealing with John Doe Defamation Cases is Needed
Craig Buske

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst

Recommended Citation
Craig Buske, Who is John Doe and Why Do We Care? Why a Uniform Approach to Dealing with John Doe
Defamation Cases is Needed, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 429 (2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol11/iss1/17

The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

BUSKE C. Who is John Doe and Why Do We Care?: Why a Uniform Approach to
Dealing with John Doe Defamation Cases is Needed. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
2010;11(1):429-452.

Note
Who is John Doe and Why Do We Care?: Why a
Uniform Approach to Dealing with John Doe
Defamation Cases is Needed
Craig Buske*
John Doe may be the most wanted person in cyberspace. Corporations
everywhere . . . are tracking him down in lawsuits that allege sins
ranging from interference with business relationships to defamation
to breach of fiduciary duty.1
This kind of case—in which a plaintiff seeks to identify a defendant
for purposes of serving process—poses a substantial challenge for
courts because they are called upon at the very outset of the case to
make the critical, and often outcome-determinative, decision whether
to permit discovery of the defendant’s identity.2

I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have utilized a variety of standards in determining
whether to allow a plaintiff to discover the identity of an
anonymous defendant. Many of the standards currently
utilized are contradictory, and oftentimes poorly explained.
This Note seeks to guide the reader through the quagmire of
existing standards, and to recommend a uniform approach to
this issue that finds common ground in satisfying the various
concerns of the courts.
 2010 Craig Buske.
* Craig Buske is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School.
1. Steve Woodward, Three Corporations Go to Court to Fight Internet
Falsehoods, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at B5.
2. Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case
Against Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 Or. L. Rev. 795,
799 (2004).
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II. THE PROBLEM OF JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS AND
HOW COURTS HAVE TRIED TO FASHION REMEDIES
A. THE RIGHT TO ANONYMOUS SPEECH
Most Americans are familiar with the right to free speech
derived from the First Amendment. If the average American
were asked what the right to free speech meant to him, he
would likely answer something about the freedom of the press
or the right to criticize our government. However, the average
layperson may not be familiar with the concept of the right to
anonymous speech.
The right to anonymous speech is largely a development of
modern jurisprudence, and its beginnings are found in Talley v.
California.3 The case concerned a Los Angeles city ordinance
that made it illegal to distribute any handbill that did not
include information identifying the name and address of the
person who created the publication.4 The petitioner in Talley
was convicted of violating the ordinance when he distributed
handbills urging people to boycott certain named businesses
that engaged in racial discrimination in hiring. Petitioner
argued that the ordinance “invaded his freedom of speech and
press
in
violation
of
the
Fourteenth
and
First
Amendments . . . .”5 The Court agreed, discussing the
important role anonymous literature has played in the
“progress of mankind” and invalidating the ordinance on the
grounds that “[t]here can be no doubt that such an
identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to
distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.”6
Although the Court’s opinion in Talley falls short of
proclaiming that “there is a right to anonymous speech under
the First Amendment,” the opinion has been used as a basis for
that conclusion.7

3. 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
4. Id. at 60.
5. Id. at 62.
6. Id. at 64. One of the most noteworthy examples of anonymous
literature that “played an important role in the progress of mankind” is the
Federalist Papers. See id. at 64–65.
7. For examples of cases that cite Talley in finding a right to anonymous
speech, see Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334,
334 (1995).
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Following Talley, jurisprudence regarding the right to
anonymous speech lay dormant, at least as far as the Supreme
Court was concerned, until it granted certiorari in McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission thirty-five years later.8 The subject
matter of McIntyre was nearly identical to that of Talley in that
a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous literature was
challenged as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.9
The Court in McIntyre defended the decision in Talley, holding
that “an author’s decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect
of freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”10 As
in Talley, one of the Court’s rationales was the important role
anonymous publications have played in the advancement of
American society, referring again to the Federalist Papers, but
also citing examples such as novels by Mark Twain (Samuel
Clemens) and O. Henry (William Sydney Porter).11
The Supreme Court relied on the right to anonymous
speech two more times in the subsequent decade to strike down
laws that required the identification of anonymous speakers. In
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, the Court
invalidated a Colorado law that required anyone circulating a
petition in favor of putting a particular initiative or issue on an
election ballot to wear a badge that included their name,
holding that “Colorado’s current badge requirement
discourages participation in the petition circulation process by
forcing name identification without sufficient cause.”12
Similarly, in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York,
Inc. v. Village of Stratton, the Court struck down a village
ordinance requiring anyone who wanted to go door-to-door to
promote any cause to obtain a permit first.13 Part of the Court’s
opposition to the permit requirement was that it required all

8. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
9. Id. at 336. The statute in McIntyre was different from the ordinance in
Talley only in that the McIntyre statute only prohibited distribution of
anonymous campaign literature, and not all anonymous literature. While the
Court in McIntyre acknowledged this fact and conceded that because of that
difference Talley does not automatically control, the distinction was not
enough to justify a different result. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344, 357.
10. Id. at 342.
11. Id. at 341–43.
12. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200
(1999).
13. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150, 168–69 (2002).
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canvassers, solicitors, and peddlers to carry the permit with
them when they went door-to-door and display it if requested
by a police officer or resident.14 The Court concluded that these
requirements resulted in “a surrender of [the canvasser’s]
anonymity,” and as such, “the ordinance may preclude such
persons from canvassing for unpopular causes.”15
The four cases discussed above—Talley, McIntyre, Buckley
and Watchtower—form the foundation for the “well-established
First Amendment right to speak anonymously.”16 Although
these cases all dealt primarily with printed materials, the
principles elucidated in those opinions have, without reserve,
been interpreted to apply not only to the physical distribution
of literature, but to the Internet as well.17
B. HOW COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS IN
THE PAST
Several competing standards have emerged to deal with
the problem of anonymous, or John Doe, defendants in
defamation cases. As the court noted in Doe v. Cahill, there is
an entire spectrum of ‘standards’ that could be required, ranging (in
ascending order) from a good faith basis to assert a claim, to pleading
sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, to a showing of prima
facie evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment, and beyond that, hurdles even more stringent.18

In order to understand the current confusion regarding the
correct standard in a John Doe defamation case, a review of the
chronological progression of these standards is necessary.
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com was one of the first
cases to analyze the competing interests of plaintiffs seeking
discovery of anonymous defendants and the “legitimate and
valuable right to participate in online forums anonymously.”19

14. Id. at 155, 166.
15. Id. at 166–67.
16. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001).
17. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (stating that there is “no
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to [the Internet]”); Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1097
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (“[T]he constitutional rights of Internet users, including
the First Amendment right to speak anonymously, must be carefully
safeguarded.”).
18. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
19. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal.
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Columbia Insurance Company filed suit in the Northern
District of California on behalf of See’s Candy Shops seeking
injunctive relief because a different entity had registered the
domain names www.seescandy.com and www.seecandys.com.20
An impasse arose when the court determined it could not grant
injunctive relief until the defendants had been served with the
complaint.21 However, the defendant could not be served with
the complaint because his identity was unclear as the domain
names had been registered online under potentially fictitious
names.22 The specific issue before the court was whether to
allow discovery before the defendant had been made a party to
the suit.23 The court adopted the following safeguards to limit
the situations in which discovery could take place before the
defendant was a party to the suit:
 “First, the plaintiff should identify the missing party
with sufficient specificity such that the Court can
determine that defendant is a real person or entity who
could be sued in federal court.”24
 “Second, the party should identify all previous steps
taken to locate the elusive defendant.”25
 “Third, plaintiff should establish to the Court’s
satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit against defendant could
withstand a motion to dismiss.”26
 Fourth, the “plaintiff should file a request for discovery
with the Court” including justification for the specific
discovery requested and “identification of a limited
number of persons” on whom discovery could be served
that will produce a “reasonable likelihood” of identifying
the defendant.27
One year later a Virginia court used a simpler standard in

1999).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 575.
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id. at 580.
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In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.28 In that
case, the plaintiff sought to compel America Online (AOL) to
provide the identities of four subscribers allegedly engaged in
defamation.29 A subpoena was issued to AOL, who
subsequently filed a Motion to Quash.30 In denying the Motion
to Quash, the court held that a non-party Internet service
provider (ISP) should only be ordered to identify a subscriber or
user if “the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate,
good faith basis” for bringing suit and “the subpoenaed identity
information is centrally needed to advance that claim.”31 The
requirement of a “good faith basis” adopted in this case is
considered one of the lowest standards required before
unmasking an anonymous defendant.32
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe represents the next
important development in John Doe defamation cases.33 The
facts were similar to those in America Online. Dendrite
International, Inc. (Dendrite) brought a defamation claim
against various John Doe defendants and sought expedited
discovery to identify the defendants.34 In Dendrite, the John
Doe defendants had posted messages on a Yahoo! bulletin
board dedicated to matters related to Dendrite.35 Specifically,
the anonymous posters accused Dendrite of restructuring its
accounting practices in a way that would cause the company’s
annual earnings to appear to increase, but without any
accompanying increase in the number of sales.36 The New
Jersey court, in denying Dendrite’s interlocutory appeal,
offered a four-step set of guidelines for trial courts to use when
“striking a balance between the well-established First
Amendment right to speak anonymously, and the right of the
plaintiff
to
protect
its
proprietary
interests
and
28. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000
WL 1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va.
2001).
29. Id. at *1.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *8.
32. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
33. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 756 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001).
34. Id. at 760.
35. Id. at 762.
36. Id.
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reputation . . . .”37 First, the plaintiff must try to notify the
anonymous posters by placing a notice regarding the identity
discovery request on the same message board where the
allegedly defamatory material appeared.38 Second, the plaintiff
must identify the exact statements made that allegedly
constitute actionable speech.39 Third, the plaintiff must
establish that its action can withstand a motion to dismiss and
must produce sufficient prima facie evidence to support each
element of its cause of action.40 Finally, the “court must balance
the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free
speech against the strength of the prima facie case
presented . . . .”41 The notification required by the court in
Dendrite is an important aspect of these guidelines. The most
important provision, however, is the third step—the ability to
withstand a motion to dismiss coupled with sufficient evidence
supporting each element of the claim. As the law develops, this
third step will be the subject of much debate.42
The next important case that addresses the issue of
identifying defendants in John Doe cases is Doe v. Cahill.43 As
the only state supreme court case to deal specifically with the
issue of John Doe defendants in defamation suits arising in the
context of the Internet, Cahill is the highest appellate court
opinion addressing the subject.44 Cahill involved a situation
that should be familiar by now: comments are posted on an
online forum; the subject of those comments doesn’t like them;
the subject subsequently sues for defamation.45 The plaintiffs

37. Id. at 760.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The main point of disagreement regarding standards in John Doe
defamation cases centers on the quantum of proof required before a plaintiff is
allowed to discover an anonymous defendant’s identity. Different standards
are adopted by the courts in nearly every John Doe defamation case discussed
in this Note.
43. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
44. Although the Wisconsin State Supreme Court dealt with a similar
subject in Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006), that suit did not
arise in the context of the Internet, but as a discovery dispute over whether
the identities of unknown members of a political organization had to be
disclosed.
45. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454.

BUSKE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

436

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

3/9/2010 11:09 AM

[Vol. 11:1

in the case were Patrick and Julia Cahill.46 Mr. and Mrs. Cahill
were residents of Smyrna, Delaware, and brought suit in
response to anonymous messages posted on a website hosted by
the Delaware State News.47 An anonymous online poster using
the alias “Proud Citizen” criticized Patrick Cahill’s performance
as a City Councilman and made other disparaging statements
about Mr. Cahill as well, alleging that he was paranoid and
that he was suffering from “an obvious mental deterioration.”48
Mr. Cahill understandably took issue with those statements,
and he and his wife filed suit on November 2, 2004.49 On June
14, 2005, the Delaware Superior Court applied a “good faith”
standard in deciding to compel disclosure of the John Doe
defendant’s identity and ordered the anonymous defendant’s
Internet Service Provider to disclose his identity.50 John Doe
filed an interlocutory appeal, which was accepted by the
Supreme Court of Delaware.51
The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court of Delaware
was whether the “good faith” standard applied by the trial
judge was the correct legal standard.52 In deciding that issue,
Cahill explicitly referenced the guidelines set forth in Dendrite,
but offered some criticisms of that standard and modified it in a
few ways. First, the court adopted the notification provision of
the Dendrite guidelines.53 However, that was the only step of
the test the court specifically adopted. Cahill instead
recharacterized the third step of Dendrite, that the plaintiff
must establish that its action can withstand a motion to
dismiss and must produce sufficient prima facie evidence to
support each element of its cause of action, as a “summary
judgment standard.”54 Although the Dendrite opinion never
used the words “summary judgment,” Cahill simply substituted
the summary judgment standard for the Dendrite language and
purported to follow the third prong of Dendrite.55 If this

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id.

BUSKE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

3/9/2010 11:09 AM

WHO IS JOHN DOE AND WHY DO WE CARE?

437

approach seems confusing, it should, because it has caused
confusion among courts and scholars ever since the opinion was
published. With regard to the rest of the test from Dendrite, the
court in Cahill dismissed the second and fourth steps as
unnecessary.56 The court found the second step subsumed by
the summary judgment standard.57 Similarly, the Cahill court
stated that balancing “the defendant’s First Amendment rights
against the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case is also
unnecessary,” because the “summary judgment test is itself the
balance.”58
Two years after Cahill, the issue of what standard to apply
when deciding to unmask a John Doe defendant was again
before an appellate court, although not in a defamation suit. In
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, an Arizona court was faced with a
plaintiff who wanted to discover the identity of an anonymous
entity that allegedly accessed certain information on Mobilisa’s
protected computer systems illegally and then sent the
information to various Mobilisa employees via e-mail.59
Although the court in Mobilisa said it agreed with the two
steps adopted in Cahill, notification and surviving a summary
judgment motion, it disagreed “with [the Cahill] court’s
conclusion that a balancing step is unnecessary.”60 The
Mobilisa opinion recognizes that there will likely be a “vast
array” of cases that involve anonymous speech, and that these
cases will be factually distinct.61 Including a balancing test will
allow the court to consider factors that might weigh against
disclosure of an anonymous defendant’s identity that are not
taken into account by a summary judgment standard, such as
whether the anonymous speaker is a non-party witness, what
type of speech was involved, and what kind of expectation of
privacy the speaker had.62 Subsequently, the Mobilisa decision
56. Id. at 461.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 715–16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
60. Id. at 720.
61. Id.
62. Id. With regard to what type of speech is at issue, the court points out
that political expression is afforded the most protection by the First
Amendment, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995),
while commercial speech is less protected than other forms of speech, Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562–63 (1980).
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revitalized the balancing test deleted from the Dendrite test by
Cahill.
The Texas Court of Appeals reiterated the absence of a
consensus regarding whether courts must balance a plaintiff’s
right to pursue her case against an anonymous defendant’s
rights under the First Amendment in In re Does 1-10.63 Less
than a month after the court in Mobilisa decided that a
balancing test was necessary to adequately protect anonymous
plaintiffs, the Texas Court of Appeals adopted only the second
prong of the test from Cahill, while disregarding the
notification provision and declining to add a balancing test.64
Following the decision in In re Does 1-10, there continues
to be disagreement regarding the inclusion of a notification step
and the necessity of a balancing test. A consensus had emerged,
however, around the summary judgment standard from Cahill.
A California decision in Krinsky v. Doe upset that emerging
consensus.65 Krinsky first pointed out the shortcomings of the
notification requirement from Dendrite and Cahill, specifically
the requirement that plaintiff post a notice of the discovery
request in the same place the allegedly defamatory comments
were originally made: “[A]n Internet Web site, chat room, or
message board may no longer exist or be active by the time the
plaintiff brings suit; consequently, it would be unrealistic and
unprofitable” to insist a plaintiff follow the notice requirement
from Dendrite and Cahill.66 Criticisms aside, the court in
Krinsky conceded the notification requirement was not unduly
burdensome.67 These two positions leave the reader, and other
courts, unclear about where the court in Krinsky stands on the
notification provision. With regard to the summary judgment
standard, the court “f[ound] it unnecessary and potentially
confusing to attach a procedural label, whether summary
judgment or motion to dismiss, to the showing required of a
plaintiff seeking the identity of an anonymous speaker . . . .”68
Instead, the court decided a plaintiff must make a prima facie
showing of the elements of their case.69 Finally, concerning the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 821–22.
Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244.
Id.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245. The context of the Krinsky opinion is slightly limited
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use of a balancing test, the Krinsky opinion concluded it was
unnecessary to balance the interests of the competing parties,
at least in a defamation case, because “[w]hen there is a factual
and legal basis for believing libel may have occurred, the
writer’s message will not be protected by the First
Amendment.”70
In summary, when deciding whether to allow a plaintiff to
discover the identity of an anonymous defendant, some courts
have required the defendant be given notice and others have
not.71 Some courts have required the defendant’s First
Amendment rights be balanced against the strength of the
plaintiff’s case, and some have held that step to be
unnecessary.72 The quantum of proof the courts deem necessary
in pleading a case ranges “from placing an extremely light
burden (indeed, virtually no burden at all) on the plaintiff, to
requiring the plaintiff to tender proof of its allegations that
would survive a summary judgment, or even more stringent
requirements.”73 It is out of this confusing state of contradictory
and competing standards that this Note attempts to reconcile
the competing interests and recommend a single standard that
may bring uniformity to the issue.
III. A UNIFORM APPROACH IS NEEDED
It is well known that different states have different
common law. This fact is the inevitable result of a judicial
system in which thousands of judges across the country try to
find equitable dispositions to the problems created by difficult
cases. In many instances, these differences in law may not
present insurmountable problems, and the courts are able to
administer effective justice. Some areas of the law, however,
suffer from a lack of uniformity. John Doe defamation cases are
because it is addressing the specific question of what standard should be
applied when the plaintiff’s cause of action is for libel and when the defendant
has already filed a Motion to Quash a subpoena seeking to obtain the identity
of the defendant. However, I believe the principles the case was decided upon
may be extrapolated to a slightly broader context without distorting the
court’s reasoning.
70. Id.
71. Compare Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005), and Dendrite
Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001),
with Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244.
72. Compare Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61, with Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
73. In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
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one such area. A new approach to John Doe defamation cases is
needed because “existing law lacks nimble ways to resolve
disputes about speech and privacy on the Internet.”74
The fact that Constitutional rights are at stake in these
cases is one of the reasons they should be closely scrutinized.
The confusing array of competing standards currently being
adopted across the country creates problems unique to John
Doe defamation cases. Most of the defamation suits that raise
problems regarding the anonymity of the defendant arise in the
context of the Internet which raises the potential for
jurisdictional problems. Unlike libelous statements published
in a newspaper that only circulates in a particular geographic
area, anything posted on the Internet is easily accessible to
anyone in the United States with an internet connection, and
as such, the defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction
in any state in America.75 As such, if standards for unmasking
a defendant are easier to meet in some jurisdictions than
others, a plaintiff in a John Doe defamation case will have
significant incentive to forum shop. This encouragement of
forum shopping is particularly troubling in light of the fact that
many plaintiffs in John Doe defamation cases are not actually
seeking a monetary reward, but rather more of a symbolic
victory.76 In many instances, simply unmasking a John Doe
defendant for the purposes of shaming them may be enough to
satisfy the plaintiff.77 If this scenario unfolds as speculated
above, the plaintiff may be able to obtain the relief they want in
violation of the defendant’s First Amendment rights, and the
defendant will be left without recourse.
The considerable confusion among different jurisdictions is
74. Daniel J. Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in
the Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REV 1195, 1199 (2006).
75. Personal jurisdiction for activity that takes place over the Internet is a
somewhat uncertain field. However, Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984),
suggests that in situations where defendants purposefully engaged in the tort
of defamation (libel, more specifically, in Calder) and their actions were
calculated to cause harm to a victim they knew to be residing in particular
state, that personal jurisdiction in the victim’s home state is appropriate. See
David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487,
553 (1991) for a discussion of how libel law in general is a field in which a
defendant may be subject to the laws of more than one state.
76. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse
in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 860, 872 (2000).
77. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005) (unmasking an
anonymous defendant affords a plaintiff an important form of relief).
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another reason to adopt uniform standards. Courts in different
jurisdictions disagree on issues frequently. However, there is a
difference between disagreement and confusion. Lower courts
that have to deal with the questions presented in John Doe
defamation cases are not merely following the decisions made
by the appellate courts in their jurisdiction, resulting in the
application of two or three competing standards. Instead, lower
courts are left without clear guidelines. Rather than having two
competing standards between federal circuits, each jurisdiction
in the country is utilizing different standards. The confusion
that results from having a myriad of different standards is
considerably greater than that created by having two
competing standards.
Another argument in favor of establishing a uniform
standard is that it will be more cost effective and efficient.
Many commentators are concerned that free speech on the
Internet will be chilled by fear of litigation and identification.78
The more complex the problem presented in litigation, the more
time and expense it will take to find a solution. As such, if
there were a uniform standard for dealing with John Doe
defamation cases, litigation expenses for such cases would
likely decrease and the chilling effect that defamation suits
have on free speech may be somewhat ameliorated.
The above paragraphs all point to the need for a uniform
approach to John Doe defamation cases. As David Anderson
remarked, “[l]ibel is a field that cries out for some
uniformity.”79 That sentiment translates wholly to defamation
in general, particularly in the context of the Internet. Based on
the First Amendment rights at issue in John Doe defamation
cases; the potential for jurisdictional problems and forum
shopping; the existing confusion regarding this area of the law;
and the potential for saving litigants, as well as the court
system, time and money, a uniform system for dealing with
John Doe defendants should be adopted by the United States
Supreme Court.
IV. THE APPROACH THAT COURTS SHOULD TAKE FOR
JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS
As demonstrated above by section II-B, courts across the
78. Id. at 457; Lidsky, supra note 76, at 861.
79. Anderson, supra note 75, at 553.
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country have chosen to deal with the problem of John Doe
defendants in many different ways. This section analyzes and
critiques the various approaches taken, and suggests a course
of action for each potential element of the test to decide
whether a court should unmask an anonymous defendant.
A. WHY A NOTIFICATION PROVISION IS NEEDED
In many instances when someone is trying to identify an
anonymous defendant, the defendant will learn about it, either
from their Internet Service Provider (ISP), or through a third
party. However, many ISPs may not notify a subscriber if they
are served with a court order to divulge that subscriber’s
identity.80 Steps have been taken to prevent this from
happening, but there is no guarantee that an Internet
subscriber will be notified before their identity is divulged.81
However, when a “provision imposes very little burden on a
defamation plaintiff while at the same time giving an
anonymous defendant the opportunity to respond,”82 and the
defendant’s “First Amendment interests are at stake,”83 a
balancing of the competing parties’ interests favors including a
notification provision. As a general principle, “[a] court should
not consider impacting a speaker’s First Amendment rights
without affording the speaker an opportunity to respond to the
discovery request.”84
Although notification of a defendant is important, any
notification provision adopted should not be absolute. In the
past, some courts have required the plaintiff to notify the
defendant by placing a notification in the same place where the
allegedly defamatory material was posted.85 The problem with
this requirement is that, due to the fluid and impermanent
nature of the Internet, the website where the allegedly

80. Vogel, supra note 2, at 802–03 (stating that in the 1990s, many ISPs
would produce the information requested in subpoenas without allowing their
subscriber to object or seek judicial intervention).
81. For example, 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1) prohibits a cable internet service
provider from disclosing “personally identifiable information,” even pursuant
to a court order, unless the subscriber is first given notice.
82. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005).
83. Id.
84. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
85. See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J.
Super Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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defamatory material was posted may no longer exist by the
time a suit is brought.86 Given this challenge, there should not
be an absolute requirement that an anonymous defendant be
notified before their identity is disclosed. However, the plaintiff
should be required to make a good faith effort to notify the
defendant, whether by posting on the same board where the
material originally appeared or through some other means,
before discovery of the defendant’s identity is allowed.87
B. A REQUIREMENT THAT THE EXACT STATEMENTS IN QUESTION
BE STATED SHOULD BE INCLUDED
The requirement found in Dendrite that the court “require
the plaintiff to identify and set forth the exact statements
purportedly made by each anonymous poster that plaintiff
alleges constitutes actionable speech,” is an important
requirement.88 Although the court in Cahill may be correct in
saying that requiring the exact statements to be set forth is
unnecessary if a summary judgment standard is being
utilized,89 there are potential problems presented by this step’s
absence. First, because this Note is not advocating a summary
judgment standard, it makes sense to retain the requirement
that the exact statements in question be set forth. Second,
procedural motions may create unique difficulties as explained
by the court in Krinsky: “[I]f a complaint is filed in a noticepleading state in which defamation claims are not excepted by
statute or case law, the second Dendrite requirement (setting
forth the statement with particularity) will be essential, while
in Wisconsin it will be superfluous . . . .”90 The requirement
that the statements in question be stated with particularity
would be superfluous because Wisconsin “require[s]
particularity in the pleading of defamation claims.”91 Although
in some states requiring the plaintiff to set forth the exact
statements that allegedly constitute defamation may be
redundant or unnecessary, the benefits to be gained from the
additional clarity provided, as well as the benefits to be realized
86. Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
87. This requirement is, of course, moot if it has been established that the
defendant already has notice that someone is seeking to learn his identity.
88. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
89. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005).
90. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244.
91. Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis. 2006).
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from having a uniform law, outweigh any concerns about
superfluous language.92
C. THE APPROPRIATE QUANTUM OF PROOF
“The proper focus . . . [of John Doe defamation suits]
should be on providing an injured party a means of redress
without compromising the legitimate right of the Internet user
to communicate freely with others.”93 Achieving this balance,
however, is easier said than done. It is the position of this Note
that the optimum quantum of proof is to require a plaintiff to
make a prima facie case for all elements of defamation that are
within the plaintiff’s control. Although requiring a plaintiff to
make a prima facie case of all elements of a claim may seem
like a high standard to impose at the discovery stage, it is
necessary. The considerations that led to this conclusion are
discussed below.
1. A High Standard is Needed to Adequately Protect First
Amendment Rights
As discussed above in section II-A, there is a well
established right to engage in anonymous speech, and that
right has been applied to the Internet without reserve.94
Unfortunately, how to protect that right in John Doe
defamation cases has not enjoyed a similar consensus, as
evinced by the wide variety of standards adopted by different
courts.95
There are many reasons to insist on a high standard in
John Doe defamation cases, one of them being the
Constitutional importance that is placed on anonymous
speech.96 The advantages to society in allowing anonymous
speech outweigh the interests of plaintiffs in easily identifying

92. In this author’s opinion, the law could benefit from a little redundancy
if it made the law easier to understand.
93. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 3–17.
95. For a discussion of the wide range of standards adopted by different
courts, see Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (2005).
96. Cases that emphasize the importance of the right to engage in
anonymous speech include: Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., v.
Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law
Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334
(1995); and Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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anonymous defendants.97 It is true that much of the “speech” on
the Internet is not scholarly discourse.98 Anyone who has used
the Internet recognizes that celebrity gossip and personal
websites that bear more similarities to online diaries make up
a large percentage of all websites.99 However, it is also true
that, partially due to its anonymous nature, the Internet is a
great equalizer, and as such it fulfills a very democratic
function—it allows anyone with an Internet connection to voice
their opinion on any matter, “however silly, profane, or brilliant
[the idea] may be . . . .”100 Some commentators have even gone
so far as to say that the Internet has had the greatest effect on
a person’s ability to make their opinion heard since the
invention of the printing press.101 The reason the Internet is
such a great innovation in speech is because it “allows ordinary
John Does to participate as never before in pnblic [sic]
discourse, and hence, to shape public policy.”102
However, the ability of the Internet to realize its potential
for facilitating a marketplace of ideas will never occur if people
do not use it for that purpose, and “[t]he free exchange of ideas
on the Internet is driven in large part by the ability of Internet
users to communicate anonymously.”103 The democratic nature
of the Internet is what gives it value deserving of being
protected by the First Amendment, and it is why a high level of
protection should be afforded to speakers on the Internet. If the
standard of proof is set too low, it may “chill potential posters
97. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
(“The right to remain anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent
conduct. But political speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable
consequences, and, in general, our society accords greater weight to the value
of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse.”)
98. Daniel J. Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in
the Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REV 1195, 1196–97 (2006).
99. Id. According to one estimate, personal websites written by children
and teenagers under the age of 19 account for over fifty percent of all blogs. G.
Jeffrey Macdonald, Teens: It’s a Diary. Adults: It’s Unsafe, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 25, 2005, at 11.
100. Vogel, supra note 2, at 815 (quoting Brief for Public Citizen, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy Information Center as Amici
Curiae at 5, Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003) (Nos. 50 WAP 2002 and 51
WAP 2002)).
101. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech:
A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, 88 (2000).
102. Lidsky, supra note 76, at 861.
103. Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
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from exercising their First Amendment right to speak
anonymously.”104
Another reason to insist that plaintiffs meet a high
evidentiary burden before being allowed to unmask an
anonymous defendant is that there is evidence to suggest many
defamation suits would not succeed if carried through to
trial.105 In fact, only 13% of plaintiffs in a libel suit will
ultimately prevail in libel litigation,106 and of those who do,
they “owe more to good fortune than ‘to their virtue, their skill,
or the justice of their cause.’”107 Because defendants are much
more likely to succeed in defamation litigation than plaintiffs,
courts should be particularly cautious in letting a suit proceed
that will irreversibly destroy the defendant’s anonymity.
Furthermore, by imposing a high standard on plaintiffs, courts
are making it easier for legitimate plaintiffs to succeed at trial,
because once “vigorous criticism descends into defamation . . .
constitutional protection is no longer available,”108 and
anonymous defendants will no longer be able to hide behind the
First Amendment.
2. Why Standards Adopted in the Past Are Inadequate
The lowest level of protection offered to anonymous
defendants in defamation cases is the good faith standard
imposed in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online,
Inc.109 It seems clear that this standard is insufficient because,
as the court remarked in Krinsky v. Doe, “[I]t offers no
practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiff’s good faith
and leaves the speaker with little protection.”110 The
condemnation of the “good faith” test was best articulated,
however, in Doe v. Cahill, which not only pointed out the test’s
shortcomings but also raised the specter of some troubling
104. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
105. Lidsky, supra note 76, at 875 (citing RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL.,
LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS 3, 239–40 (1987)).
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER,
AND RELATED PROBLEMS at xxix (2d ed. 1994)).
108. Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
109. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000
WL 1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va.
2001).
110. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241.
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consequences of applying such a lax standard, making it clear
that a good faith standard offers too little protection for John
Doe defendants:
Plaintiffs can often initially plead sufficient facts to meet
the good faith test . . . even if the defamation claim is not very
strong, or worse, if they do not intend to pursue the defamation
action to a final decision. After obtaining the identity of an
anonymous critic through the compulsory discovery process, a
defamation plaintiff who either loses on the merits or fails to
pursue a lawsuit is still free to engage in extra-judicial self-help
remedies; more bluntly, the plaintiff can simply seek revenge or
retribution.111
The next lowest quantum of proof that courts have
required of plaintiffs to successfully unmask an anonymous
defendant is requiring a plaintiff to bring a claim that could
survive a motion to dismiss.112 In order to survive a motion to
dismiss, all a plaintiff is required to do is include sufficient
information to give “general notice of the claim asserted.”113
This standard is also insufficient to protect an anonymous
defendant’s First Amendment rights. Even if a claim is not
meritorious or is unlikely to win, it may still survive a motion
to dismiss. When weighing a right that is protected by the
Constitution, simply requiring a plaintiff to assert a coherent
legal claim is not a high enough threshold because “even silly
or trivial libel claims can easily survive a motion to dismiss
where the plaintiff pleads facts that put the defendant on
notice of his claim, however vague or lacking in detail these
allegations may be.”114 The opinion in Cahill went on to point
out that if the motion to dismiss standard does not afford

111. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
112. Although the words “motion to dismiss” were used in the standard
promulgated by the court in Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756,
760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), that was not exactly the standard
adopted because in addition to being able to survive a motion to dismiss, the
court also required a plaintiff to support each element of his cause of action
with prima facie evidence. A motion to dismiss standard was also adopted by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687
(Wis. 2006), but again it was not a true motion to dismiss standard because in
Wisconsin plaintiffs are required to plead defamation suits “with
particularity.” Id.
113. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458 (quoting Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029,
1034 (Del. 1998); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)).
114. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 459.
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enough protection for anonymous defendants, then the good
faith standard is also clearly insufficient.115
The next standard utilized by courts in an attempt to
protect First Amendment rights of anonymous defendants is
the summary judgment standard.116 The summary judgment
standard suffers from a different problem than the standards
that have already been discussed. Rather than failing to
provide enough protection to anonymous defendants, the
summary judgment standard lacks the clarity that is needed
for a well formulated quantum of proof. In applying the
summary judgment standard to John Doe defamation cases,
the court acts as if the anonymous party has made a motion for
summary judgment, and decides whether the plaintiff would
survive that motion.117 If the plaintiff can survive a motion for
summary judgment they are allowed to discover the
defendant’s identity. To succeed in learning the identity of an
anonymous defendant under a summary judgment standard, a
plaintiff would have to show that, based on the pleadings, the
discovery material currently before the court, and any
affidavits, there is a genuine issue as to a material fact of the
plaintiff’s defamation claim.118 This does not mean merely the
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties.119 To survive the summary judgment step, a plaintiff
would have to show that there is a genuine dispute over some
fact or facts that could affect the outcome of the case.120
This practice of attaching a procedural label, while perhaps
constituting a high enough hurdle that it adequately protects
the defendant’s anonymity, is “unnecessary and potentially
confusing.”121 The principal complaint about utilizing this kind

115. Id.
116. The standard required plaintiffs to include as much information in
their motion to compel discovery of an anonymous defendant’s identity as
would be necessary to survive a motion for summary judgment. The Cahill
court used it, 884 A.2d at 460–61, and claimed it originated in Dendrite Int’l,
Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), even though
the Dendrite court never explicitly used those terms.
117. See, e.g. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460.
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).
119. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).
120. Id.
121. Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). This
shortcoming of the summary judgment standard also applies to the motion to
dismiss standard.
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of procedural language is that it results in a standard that does
not clearly state the requisite quantum of proof, and while most
lawyers dealing with this issue will be familiar with the
summary judgment standard, an assumption of knowledge is a
poor substitute for genuine clarity. Another problem with
utilizing a procedural label in this context is that Internet
defamation suits “may relate to actions filed in other
jurisdictions, which may have different standards governing
pleadings and motions; consequently, it could generate more
confusion to define an obligation by referring to a particular
motion procedure.”122
3. A Standard Requiring Plaintiffs to Make a Prima Facie Case
of All Elements of a Defamation Claim Within Their Control
Should Be Implemented.
Requiring plaintiffs to make a prima facie case for each
element of a defamation claim within their control is the
quantum of proof that should be applied in John Doe
defamation cases. This standard requires plaintiffs to meet a
higher burden than either the “good faith” standard or the
“motion to dismiss” standard, both of which offer inadequate
First Amendment protections. The “prima facie” standard is
also devoid of the confusing procedural terms that plague the
“summary judgment” standard. By implementing a “prima
facie” standard, the principal shortcomings of all of the existing
standards would be alleviated.
D. A BALANCING TEST IS NECESSARY
The last provision of the standards used in John Doe
defamation cases about which there is debate is whether to
include a balancing test at the end of the test, whereby a court
would “balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of
anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie
case presented . . . .”123 In Doe v. Cahill, the court dismissed the
balancing test as unnecessary because a balancing test would
add “no protection above and beyond that of the summary
judgment test and needlessly complicates the analysis.”124

122. Id.
123. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001).
124. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005).
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These objections do not outweigh the benefits of including a
balancing test. Allowing a court to conduct a balancing of
interests adds only minimal complexity to the overall test. As
for the summary judgment test itself providing the balance,
that conclusion fails to consider “whether balancing a broader
range of competing interests is warranted.”125 Such broader
interests that may need to be taken into account, but which
would be neglected without a balancing test, include what type
of speech is involved; the speaker’s expectation of privacy; the
consequences unmasking the speaker will have, both on
himself and on others; and the availability of other discovery
methods.126
V. A UNIFORM APPROACH IS NOT AS FAR AWAY AS IT
MAY SEEM
Many of the current interjurisdictional disagreements
regarding John Doe defamation cases are differences that may
be settled easily. While there is admittedly much disagreement
about what quantum of proof to require,127 the other elements
of the standard to apply when deciding to unmask an
anonymous defendant are much less controversial. For
example, several cases have required a notification provision.128
However, most of the cases that failed to include a notification
provision did not do it because they thought it was a bad idea—
they did it because they felt it was unnecessary.129 For
example, in In re Does 1-10, the court declined to impose a
notification provision, but the opinion never explicitly stated
that a notification was a bad idea.130 In fact, the court in In re
Does 1-10 adopts the standard used by the court in Doe v.
Cahill,131 which contained a notification provision.132
125. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
126. Id.
127. See supra section II-B.
128. See supra section II-B.
129. E.g., In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). The court
in Krinsky v. Doe did state that a requirement that a plaintiff post a notice in
the same place where the allegedly defamatory material was posted that they
are seeking to learn the anonymous defendant’s identity may be “unrealistic
and unprofitable” in some circumstances, but the court did not object to the
idea of general notification. Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008).
130. In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007)
131. Id. at 822–23.
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The requirement that the exact statements be set forth is
another element that is not very controversial. The courts that
have rejected it have done so mainly on the grounds that it is
unnecessary.133 But, as with the notification provision, just
because a step of analysis is not always necessary does not
mean courts will find the requirement that the exact
statements be included to be a bad idea.
Even the most controversial aspect of developing a test for
when to unmask anonymous defendants in John Doe
defamation cases, i.e. which quantum of proof to use, is not as
contentious as it might seem. The two highest courts to decide
the issue, the Supreme Court of Delaware134 and the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin135 essentially agree on the standard .
Although the court in Cahill called for a “summary judgment
test”136 and the court in Lassa adopted a “motion to dismiss”
standard,137 these are functionally equivalent because
Wisconsin requires “particularity in the pleading of defamation
claims.”138
VI. A SUGGESTED UNIFORM APPROACH
If implemented, the uniform approach advocated in this
Note might look something like this:
 First, the plaintiff must make a good faith effort to notify
the defendant that plaintiff is seeking to learn his
identity.
 Second, in any motion to discover the identity of an
anonymous defendant, plaintiff must state the exact
statements that allegedly constitute actionable speech.
 Third, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of each
element of defamation that is in his control.
 Finally, the court must balance the plaintiff’s right to
132. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005),
133. Id. at 461 (explaining that if the court adopts a high enough
evidentiary standard in John Doe defamation cases, in this instance a
summary judgment standard, that evidentiary standard would subsume a
requirement that the exact statements be set forth).
134. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
135. Lassa v. Rongstad, 719 N.W. 2d 673 (Wis. 2006).
136. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
137. Lassa, 719 N.W.2d at 687.
138. Id.
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relief against the defendant’s right to engage in
anonymous speech.
VII. CONCLUSION
The situation presented any time there is a John Doe
defendant creates problems above and beyond the normal
difficulties of bringing a suit. The entity bringing the suit
obviously believes it was wronged or it would not be in court.
However, the rights of the plaintiff must be balanced against
the First Amendment rights of the John Doe defendant. When
two opposing entities both have strong competing interests, it is
difficult to strike a balance between them, and this difficulty is
illustrated by the confused and contradictory development of
case law on the subject. However, this Note suggests that an
appropriate balance between the two rights can be achieved if
the plaintiff is required to make a good faith effort to notify the
defendant of the suit, to set forth the exact statements that
allegedly constitute actionable speech, to make a prima facie
case for all elements of the wrongful act allegedly committed
that are within the plaintiff’s control, and the court concludes
by balancing the rights of the plaintiff against the rights of the
defendant. This test is free of confusing procedural terms and
can be applied universally to jurisdictions that require only
notice pleading in defamation cases (e.g. Delaware) as well as
jurisdictions that require more “particularity in the pleading of
defamation claims” (e.g. Wisconsin).139 Advocating the abovedescribed standard is the principal purpose of this Note.
However, the only way uniformity, coherence, and finality will
be brought to this area of the law is if the United States
Supreme Court grants certiorari to a John Doe defamation
case.

139. Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis. 2006).

